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History of Contemporary Marriage

The Winding Road from Form to
Function: A Brief History of
Contemporary Marriage
by
J. Herbie DiFonzo and Ruth C. Stern*

Introduction
Consider this contrast: American marriage was once "rigid,
work-centered, custom regulated, with well-defined roles for husband, wife, and children," but now may be characterized as "flexible, pleasure-centered, co-operatively regulated, with loosely
defined roles for husband, wife, and children." The accuracy of
this comparison between conjugal unions past and present may
be debated, although on the whole the distinction it draws seems
defensible. What might startle the reader, however, is that
quoted contrast appeared in a 1955 college sociology text entitled
"Making the Most of Marriage." 1 The author, noted sociologist
Paul H. Landis, celebrated the pliable, fun-loving marriage of his
time by measuring it against its static predecessor from the early
twentieth century. Historical accounts should beware the Panglossian fallacy, and recognize that contemporary marriages are
never the best of all possible unions, because the family is always
2
"in transition."
* J. Herbie DiFonzo is Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School,
<lawjhd@hofstra.edu>. Ruth C. Stern is an attorney and former Coordinator of
Family Law Programs at Hofstra University Law School, <branwe11226@msn.com>. We thank Patricia Kasting, law librarian at Hofstra University Law School, and Angela Burton, Hofstra Law Class of 2009, for their
fabulous research assistance.
1 PAUL H. LANDIS, MAKING THE MOST OF MARRIAGE 13 (1955); see also
ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 76-77 (1951) (contrasting the modern family, "an almost purely consuming
and affectional unit," with the "old-style 'trustee family'-practically a self-contained social system.")
2 Compare RAY E. BABER, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, ch. 1 "The

Family in Transition" (2d ed. 1953), with

FAMILY IN TRANSITION

Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick, eds., 14th ed. 2006).

(Arlene S.
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But what is the state of contemporary marriage, and what
light can recent history shed on it? Since the 1950s, while some
aspects of marriage have dramatically changed, others have stubbornly resisted alteration. This essay suggests one unifying principle to interpret the trends in the legal treatment of marriage
and its alternatives. American society is currently in a transitional stage along the continuum from exclusively sanctioning
families based on biological and adoptive bounds to legally recognizing functional families.
Part I offers a legal and cultural snapshot of American marriage in the middle of the twentieth century. It suggests that the
apparent tranquility of the 1950s marriage, along with its pursuit
of domestic perfection and culture of familial bliss, constituted a
reaction to the turbulence which surrounded family life in World
War II and the immediate postwar years. In fact, as the fear of
Nazis mutated into dread of a Red mushroom cloud, marriages
in the cold war era became models of family engineering, providing shelter against the omnipresent uncertainty of the world beyond the hearth. Marriage was wildly popular in this era, and
represented the cultural norm: more than three-quarters of all
households were married-couple ones. 3 Divorce, despite its relative infrequency when compared with rates a generation later,
was viewed with alarm.
The transition of conjugal institutions from form to function
was in an embryonic stage. The marital union was largely regulated by common law rules, which viewed marriage as the sine
qua non of family formation. But divorce had escaped the formalism of the legal structure: although fault grounds remained in
place, divorce was operationally run on mutual consent principles. Couples desirous of dissolving their connubial bonds came
to an agreement on the issues of children, support, and property.
The actual grounds presented in court were, most often, not only
fictional but choreographed-and nearly everyone knew it.
Part II explores how marriage has altered over the past halfcentury, and-significantly-how it has held against the tide. The
legal regime governing domestic institutions has experienced a
touch of entropy, the devolution of a considerable amount of
3
Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer L. Gillan, From Our Family to Yours: Rethinking the "Beneficial Family" and Marriage-CentricCorporate Benefits Programs, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 28 (2005).
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power from the State to the people it used to regulate. American
culture has become a hothouse for domestic experimentation,
and family law has struggled to retain coherence and control.
The era which gave birth to the Baby Boomers could not have
imagined de facto parents, adoption by same-sex couples, transitional alimony, the universal availability of effective contraception, or that unmarried adults and their dependents would some
day comprise a majority of households. These developments reflect a pragmatic approach to marriage and its alternatives, and a
distinct shift in legal norms from form to function. On the other
hand, while the roles of wife and husband, mother and father
have slipped out of their postwar casing, they have not slid very
far away. Traditional gendered norms in beauty, intelligence,
and education continue to hold sway in partner selection. And,
in rearing children, the verb "mothering" still refers to the significant workload of women with children, while the verb "fathering" is often still limited to supplying economic sustenance, as
well as the requisite male genetic material. Most importantly,
men tend to retain their financial hegemony, both over women in
general and over wives in particular.
The brief Epilogue to this historical essay suggests that the
centrifugal pull of social experimentation is matched by the centripetal pressure of crafting effective legal rules to serve the multiplying number of alternative domestic unions. The drive from
form to function in family law is strong and growing stronger, as
theory strains to keep pace with the exuberant practice of living
families.

I. Marriage in Mid-Twentieth Century America
The prelude to contemporary marriage occurred shortly
before 1950. With amazing unanimity, postwar Americans subscribed to a rarefied vision of the nuclear family and bent their
lives, hopes and energies to achieve it. 4 Never before nor since
has there been such concerted pursuit of domestic perfection. A
4

See generally ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN

(1988); see Paul H. Landis, Divorce in Our
Time, 105 FORUM 865 (1946) (observing that the "companionship family,"
which "prizes romance and its ethereal happiness," was replacing the "institutional family rooted in the traditions of child-bearing, joint economic activity
and filial duty.")
FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA

4
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tailor-made target for the iconoclasm that followed, the period
lasted little more than a decade before falling prey to the individualism it had sought to suppress. And although the 1950s was a
transient, aberrational period in the culture of marriage, it conceived a standard of familial bliss that preoccupies us to this day.
Succeeding generations have chosen either to embrace the nuclear family, to modify it, or reject it outright. They have tried to
redefine it, reconceptualize and reinvent it. But the departure
point for their analyses and explorations, and the yardstick by
which alternatives are measured, is often still that one ideal. For
believed they had dea brief historical moment, Americans truly
5
marriage.
of
riddle
the
solved
finitively
A. Cold War Families
The years immediately following the end of World War II
were not conducive to marital stability. Millions of returning
G.I.'s, many of them absent husbands and absent fathers, found
they had to "elbow their way back into their families."'6 Their
reassertion of domestic authority often met with the resistance of
their wives and children. Further, these men had to readjust to
the workplace, find jobs, resume careers, or take on years of
schooling under the generous terms of the G.I. Bill. 7 Working
women were displaced by returning soldiers and the closing of
munitions plants, forced by the millions "out of the factory and
into the home."'8 Faced with a severe housing shortage, families
moved in with friends and relatives, fraying tempers and strain5 The 1950s marriage was not at all "traditional." To the contrary, family
life in this era "was the first wholehearted effort to create a home that would
fulfill virtually all its members' personal needs through an energized and expressive personal life." MAY, supra note 4, at 11. See also STEPHANIE COONTZ,
THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP

25-41 (1992) (describing the 1950s family as "a qualitatively new phenomenon,"
id. at 25).
6

STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS

35 (1997). For a poignant cinematographic depiction of the difficulties veterans had in elbowing back, see THE
BEST YEARS OF OUR LIVES (SAMUEL GOLDWYN PRODUCTIONS 1946).
7 JAMES GILBERT, ANOTHER CHANCE: POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1985,
at 57 (2nd ed. 1986).
8 Id. Within two years after war's end, two million women had lost their
jobs. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFrIEs 589 (1993).
WITH AMERICA'S CHANGING FAMILIES
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ing relationships. 9 By 1946, a surging divorce rate was claiming
one in three marriages. 10
Within a short time, prosperity returned and "set off a mood

of celebration and hope" in those who had weathered years of
Depression and war. 1 Sixty percent of Americans attained a
middle-class standard of living by the mid-1950s. In the postwar
economic glow, the nuclear family was transforming itself into a
"secure oasis."' 12 Just as communism and the threat of atomic
annihilation could be controlled by containment, each home be-

came a "sphere of influence," the safest of havens, where potential social threats were neutralized. 13 Secure in their homes and
surrounded by children, Americans defied "doomsday predictions," and determined to "ward off their nightmares and live out
their dreams. '14 With its seemingly endless supply of ranch-style
houses and consumer goods, the United States bestowed upon its

citizens the ultimate in liberty and privacy rights, the "freedom to

15
pursue the good life at home.'
It was assumed that, sooner or later, those who came of age
during and after World War II would get married. They were, in
fact, the "most marrying generation on record. '16 The century-

high peak was reached in 1960, when 68% of the population 14
years of age or older were married, 17 with all but 5% of the
9 COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE, supra note 6, at 35.
10 Id. See PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 9295(1959) (discussing the divorce rate during and immediately following World
War II).
11
ARLENE SKOLNICK, EMBATTLED PARADISE 54 (1991).
12 COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE, supra note 6, at 35.
13 MAY, supra note 4, at 14. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 8, at 591 ("A
family was a single perfect universe-instead of a complicated, fragile mechanism of conflicting political and emotional pulls.")
14
MAY, supra note 4, at 24.
15 NANCY F. CoTr, PUBLIC VowS 197 (2000). In 1959, when Vice President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev engaged in the famous "kitchen debate," the two cold war rivals focused not on forms of
government or deployment of missiles, but instead on "the relative merits of
American and Soviet washing machines, televisions, and electric ranges." MAY,
supra note 4, at 16.
16 MAY, supra note 4, at 20.
17 Id. at 21, Table 6. Census tabulations for the three decades, 1950, 1960,
and 1970, report the adult married population rising from 66% to 68% and then
falling to 63%. Conversely, the percentage of single adults decreased from 23%

6
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adults eventually exchanging vows in the 1950s.1 1 The fertility
rate, at 3.8 children per woman, was no less stunning.19 Because

of the accelerated pace of childbearing, many young mothers
likely had two or more children in diapers at once. 20 A previous
generation might have turned to extended family members for
help. In the 1950s, however, the nuclear family reveled in its self21
sufficiency, substituting "marital solidarity" for ties of kinship.
For many families, the flight to the suburbs signified emancipation from ethnicity and family tradition.22 Except for emergencies, parents and relatives were expected to refrain from
interfering, and the "isolated conjugal unit" was deemed "desira'23
ble, right, and proper by social consensus.
From within their sharply delineated roles as breadwinners

and homemakers, men and women pooled their "emotional and
financial eggs" and placed them all within the "small basket of
the immediate nuclear family."'24 Not content to merely build

upon existing traditions, postwar families invested in a new, experimental domestic utopia. 25 The deviance of 1950s family pat-

terns from those of earlier eras points up several anomalies.

26
Within the decade, birth control technologies rapidly advanced,
'27
yet the U.S. rate of childbearing "approached that of India.

to 21% before rising to 25%. In all three census tallies, the percentage of divorced and widowed adults held steady at 8% and 3%, respectively. Id. The
source census statistics may be found at U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL

STATISTICS OF THE UNITED

STATES, COLONIAL

TIMES TO 1970, Series A 160-171. Marital Status of the Population, by Age and

Sex: 1890 to 1970, available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970pl-02.pdf.
18 Paul C. Glick, American Families:As They Are and Were, in FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 93 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick, eds., 8th ed. 1994).
19 Id. at 94.
20 COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE, supra note 6, at 36.
21 ROBERT F. WINCH, THE MODERN FAMILY 662 (rev. ed. 1963); see also
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 47 ("The extraordinary emphasis in modern, urban,
middle-class America upon the marriage pair is bound to result ... in a greatly
simplified kinship structure of isolated families.")
22 MAY, supra note 4, at 25.
23 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 48.
24
COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE, supra note 6, at 37.
25 Id. at 36.
26 GILBERT, supra note 7, at 62
27 SKOLNICK, supra note 11, at 52.
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One of America's largest increases in women's employment occurred in the 1950s, yet women had received greater percentages
of doctoral and masters degrees in the 1930s. 28 Rather than following a line of social and political progression, postwar marriage
was a "throwback to the Victorian cult of domesticity with its
polarized sex roles and almost religious reverence for home and
hearth. ' 29 The white middle class established norms which ultimately shaped the social, political and economic lives of all
Americans. 30 Those who failed to conform were at risk of becoming "marginalized, stigmatized, and disadvantaged as a result."'3 1 Adaptation, not resistance or political activism, was the
32
ruling wisdom of the day.
In the "era of the expert, ' 33 postwar Americans relied on
Benjamin Spock's Baby and Child Care34 and on Norman Vincent Peale's The Power of Positive Thinking35 as formulas for
success. The profession of marriage counseling, which began in
the 1930's, developed into the practice of family therapy and became established and respected in the 1950s. 36 There was, apparently, some need for therapeutic intervention. The dual
28 GILBERT, supra note 7, at 68. According to sociologist Arlene Skolnick, in 1930 half of all professionals were women. In the 1950s, women who
attended college did so in pursuit of husbands, often dropping out in order to
marry. Women who participated in the 1950s workforce were largely middleclass, married and over 35. Instead of seeking careers, they worked in part-time
clerical or service jobs to supplement the family income. They did, however,
help to eradicate stigmatizing notions that only lower-class married women
worked, or those with husbands in "dire financial straits." SKOLNICK, supra note
11, at 53.
29

SKOLNICK, supra note 11, at 52.

30

MAY, supra note 4, at 13.

31

Id. Women were culturally cabined within their new domestic status.

See HALBERSTAM, supra note 8, at 590 ("[S]hort stories in women's magazines
about career women.., portrayed women who were unhappy and felt them-

selves emotionally empty. Instead, the magazines and the new television
sitcoms glorified dutiful mothers and wives.")
32 MAY, supra note 4, at 28.
33

Id. at 26.

34

BENJAMIN SPOCK, THE COMMON SENSE BOOK OF BABY AND CHILD

CARE (1946).
35

NORMAN VINCENT PEALE, THE POWER OF POSITIVE THINKING (1952).

36

GILBERT, supra note 7, at 62. One writer of the period even proposed

that differential functioning of the endocrine system might contribute to marital
disharmony. Irritation and incompatibility with the spouse's level of excitability

8
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idealization of married women as scintillating sex objects while
wholly absorbed in nurturing their young drove thousands of
married women "to therapists, tranquilizers, or alcohol when
''37 Men, too, felt entrapped
they actually tried to live up to it.

within the role of "good-provider," 38 stressed and confined in
competitive, increasingly bureaucratic environments. 39 Both
men and women looked to the psychologists to label and explain
their feelings and to help them adapt. 40 A "distinctly apolitical"

strategy, this type of expertise "reinforced the political consensus" by blaming personal weakness rather than flawed institutions for marital dissatisfaction. 41 As couples "sealed the

psychological boundaries around the family, they also sealed
their fates within it.''42 That these relatively fragile structures
were burdened by high expectations was not an immediate cause
for alarm in the 1950s. 43 Outside the safety and security of domesticity lurked dangerous emotional, financial and social hardships.44 Even a bad marriage was better than the drastic, evil
45
measure of divorce.

could be glandular in origin and best approached from a medical perspective.
See BABER, supra note 2, at 235-237.
37 COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE, supra note 5, at 9. In 1963,
Betty Friedan would expose the contradictions of "feminine fulfillment" in her
classic THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE.
38 Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION, supra note 18, at 352.
39 MAY, supra note 4, at 185.
40 Id. at 187; JOSEPH VEROFF ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH IN AMERICA:
PATTERNS OF HELP-SEEKING FROM 1957 TO 1976, at 7-8, 10 (1981).
41 MAY, supra note 4, at 187.
42 Id. at 36.
supra note 1, at 77.
supra note 4, at 36.
45 Id. at 203-4. Concern about divorce rates in the aftermath of World
War II may have had a significant impact on some contemporary observers'
conclusion that 1950s marriages were fragile, even as other indicators denoted
marital stability. See, e.g., BABER, supra note 2, at 173 ("Few will dispute the
claim that the marriage relationship is becoming more difficult."); WILLIAMS,
supra note 1, at 75 ("In spite of many cultural prescriptions nominally supporting the permanence of the marriage tie and the solidity of the nuclear family,
American society is characterized by high rates of divorce and other forms of
family dissolution.")
43

WILLIAMS,

44

MAY,
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B. Setting the Boundaries
Just after World War II, the Gallup poll released a survey
showing that 35% of Americans favored stricter divorce laws,
31% believed they should not be changed at all, and only 9%
supported liberalized measures. 46 The postwar public took "a
keen interest in the health of the family unit, ' 47 and they were
"determined to get married and stay married. ' 48 Marital unions
formed in the postwar decade achieved a notable degree of stability. This cohort of Americans was, in fact, the only group in
the last hundred years "to show a substantial, sustained shortfall
in their lifetime levels of divorce. '49 Once couples became ensconced in matrimony, many states conspired to "keep them
there" 50 by limiting the grounds for divorce. 51 But blocking the
marital exit was not the only way the states contrived to promote
the preservation of marriage. Marriage licensing laws examined
the fitness of marital candidates and excluded "certain types of
mental defectives, '' 52 as well as those with venereal disease. 53 To
prevent "hasty elopement[s]," 54 many states instituted waiting
periods, usually from one to five days, before granting marriage
license applications.5 5 Common law marriage, because it frustrated state efforts to determine who could marry and procreate,
was recognized in only eighteen states in the early 1950s. 56 When
a jurisdiction retained common law marriage, it did so to "regularize unions which the parties were otherwise free to abandon at
46
47
48

Gilbert, supra note 7, at 62.
Id.
MAY, supra note 4, at 185 (italics in original).

25 (1981).
William E. Nelson, Patriarchyor Equality: Family Values or Individuality, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 435, 445 (1996).
51 See generally J. HERBIE DiFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE
49

ANDREW CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE

50

POPULAR

AND

LEGAL

CULTURE

OF

DIVORCE

IN

TWENTIETH-CENTURY

AMERICA (1997). New York, one of the most restrictive states, permitted di-

vorce solely on the ground of adultery from 1787 until 1967. J. Herbie DiFonzo
& Ruth C. Stern, Addicted To Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has Lagged in New
York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 559 (2007).
52 HARRIET F. PILPEL & THEODORA ZAVIN, YOUR MARRIAGE AND THE
LAW 39 (1952).
53 Id. at 36-39.
54 Id. at 44.
55 Id. at 43-44.
56 Id. at 40.
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will and to prevent the bastardization of children. 57 As a matter
of social policy, the "law's preference for marriage could not

58
have been more clear."
In 1952, more than half the states had laws prohibiting marriage between whites and those of other races. 59 Most com-

monly, whites and blacks were forbidden to marry although, in
various states, whites could not wed Indians, Chinese, Japanese,
mulattoes, Malays and Mongolians. 60 In the late 1940's a white

woman and a black man brought suit against the state of California for denying them a marriage license. 61 The California Supreme Court struck down the state's mixed-race marriage ban on
fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds. 62 Following
this "signal precedent," 63 nearly half of the remaining states with

interracial marriage prohibitions decided to abolish them. 64 In
contrast to the considerable number of states that disapproved of

interracial unions, only a few considered habitual criminals, drug

65
addicts and chronic alcoholics as undesirable marriage partners.

By importing nineteenth-century legal constructs of husband
and wife into the postwar era, states ensured the survival of a

number of traditions. Thus, husbands were still entitled to manage the family resources and choose the location of the family
domicile. 66 Wives, though entitled to support, could not dictate
how the marital resources were to be allocated. 67 Domestic violence remained hidden in the "private sphere, ' 68 and husbands
57
58

Id.

Nelson, supra note 50, at 444.
PILPEL & ZAVIN, supra note 52, at 26.
Id. at 26-28. Pilpel and Zavin note that Arizona, "apparently concerned with the possibility of having the ranges overrun by turbaned riders,
prohibits the marriage of whites with Hindus." Id. at 27.
61
Cor, supra note 15, at 184. The California statute banned marriage of
a white person "with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian, or member of the Malay
race." Id.
62 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948).
63
CoTr, supra note 15, at 185.
64 Id. Bans on interracial marriage were declared violative of the federal
constitution in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
65 PILPEL & ZAVIN, supra note 52, at 29.
66
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 306 (2000). See infra
text at notes 95-102 (discussing the limits of this doctrine.)
67
Id.
68
Id.
59
60
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and wives were barred from testifying against each other. 69 A
spouse who was physically injured by the other might seek criminal sanctions but was precluded in most states from suing the
other for damages in personal tort actions. 70 Also, since sexual
intercourse between husband and wife was legally authorized,
and indeed a "male marital sexual right, '71 marital rape could
never be defined as unlawful and, therefore, was not a criminal
act.

72

A sexual double-standard was broadly observed in 1950s law
and culture. For example, New York's restrictive dissolution
laws did not allow for divorce on the ground of cruelty, but did
allow for judicial separations on that ground. 73 In such actions,
isolated acts of violence by a husband against his wife did not
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment.7 4 But a single violent
act committed by a wife against her husband amounted to wrongdoing on her part sufficient to deny her both a separation and
69

Id.

70

JOHN DEWITr

GREGORY,

ET AL.

UNDERSTANDING

FAMILY LAW

§ 7.02[A], at 206 (3d ed. 2005); PILPEL & ZAVIN, supra note 52, at 55. Tort suits
by wives against husbands for harm to their property interests were allowable
under the Married Women's Property Acts, which all states had adopted by the
end of the nineteenth century. But interspousal suits for personal injuries were
barred for two reasons born of somewhat contradictory policy concerns: (1)
such actions might encourage fraud upon insurers through collusion between
the spouses; and (2) such suits would destroy the "peace and harmony" of the
marital home. GREGORY, ET AL., id. Interspousal tort immunity has been subjected to prolonged and acerbic criticism. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 10.1, at 371 (2d ed.
1988) ("the kindest thing to be said about ... these policy arguments is that
they are frivolous.") Since 1970, the immunity rule "has been transformed dramatically from a majority to a minority rule." Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort
Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 359 (1989).
71 HARTOG, supra note 66, at 306-7.
72 Id. The prevalent view in the 1950s was that a husband who coerced
his wife into sexual intercourse was not committing rape, since the element of
unlawfulness was missing. Id. at 307. Only in the 1980s did scholars and courts
engage in serious reconsideration of this view. Today, while most states allow
for rape prosecutions in cases in which husbands and wives were estranged,
many states still bar the prosecution of husbands for raping wives with whom
they were living. GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.08[C], at 230.
73 Nelson, supra note 50, at 517.
74 Id. (citing cases).

12
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maintenance (spousal support). 75 The courts' double standard in
defining cruelty flowed from a "[j]udicial blindness to the faults
of men and indifference to the difficulties faced by women" that
characterized the postwar era. 76 As long as a wife appeared able
to cohabit and co-exist with her husband, courts would deny her
a separation. 77 Since 1920, courts had enforced a policy of keeping husband and wife together, 78 and the burden of accommodat79
ing to a troubled marriage "fell largely on wives."
That wives in troubled marriages had limited options became clear in McGuire v. McGuire,80 a 1953 decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court which has achieved "a paradigmatic
stature in American family law."'8 1 The decision "mobilized the
language of marital privacy"8 2 because it refused to invade "the
private domain of the family. 8s3 Even if deeply disturbed, intact
marriages were virtually insulated from legal intervention. Lydia
McGuire was a hardworking farm wife whose husband Charles,
although fairly wealthy, deprived her of all but the most basic
necessities. 84 She desired neither a divorce nor separation, but
entreated the court to "compel her rich husband to make her life
a little less bleak. '85 Overturning the trial court's ruling in her
Axelrod v. Axelrod, 150 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, 1956).
Nelson, supra note 50, at 514.
77 Baker v. Baker, 228 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1962).
78 Reese v. Reese, 185 N.Y.S. 110, 111 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1920).
79 Nelson, supra note 50, at 518. Annulment rulings in this era demonstrated the same gender bias. New York cases declared a man entitled to an
annulment if his wife had failed to disclose a previous illegitimate pregnancy, or
even if "she turned out not to be the virgin he had expected her to be." Id. at
514 (citing cases). But a wife who proved prior undisclosed sexual activity on
the part of her husband-impregnating an unwed girl who bore him a childwas denied an annulment. Pankiw v. Pankiw, 256 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County, 1965).
80 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
81
HARTOG, supra note 66, at 9.
75

76

82
83

Id.
Id. at 8.

Mr. McGuire paid for groceries directly and had not given his wife any
money at all for years. Their 1929 Model A Ford coupe was equipped with a
faulty heater and their home lacked indoor plumbing as well as a reliable furnace. Mrs. McGuire was permitted to make only local telephone calls and paid
for out-of-state visits to her adult children with money she had made raising
chickens. Id. at 6-7 (summarizing trial transcript).
85 Id. at 7.
84
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favor, the state supreme court held that a family's living standards were "a matter of concern to the household, and not for
the courts to determine. '86 Even a court of equity could not presume to interfere where the husband and wife were living together. 87 A separated or divorced wife might petition for
support, but Lydia McGuire faced the unenviable choice of bowing to her husband's superior property rights or leaving the
marriage. 88
What is the significance of the McGuire case? On one level,
it propounded the still-valid rule that courts will not lightly intrude into an intact marriage. 89 But was this marriage truly intact? Lydia's petition had described her husband as a very
headstrong man" and averred that she was "afraid of what might
happen to her personally when legal service of summons has
been served upon the defendant." 90 Lydia requested and was
granted a temporary restraining order against Charles, 91 but the
state supreme court noted that she made no attempt to prove her
allegations, and "the fact that she continued to live with the defendant is quite incompatible" 92 with her accusations. 93 At bot86

59 N.W.2d at 342.

HARTOG, supra note 66, at 8. See McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342 ("As
long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife it
may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of
the marriage relation is being carried out.")
88 HARTOG, supra note 66, at 10. Whether Lydia McGuire could have left
the marriage is problematic, as she did not appear to have grounds to seek
separation or divorce. A woman who moved out without adequate grounds
would be deemed to have abandoned her marriage, and thus entitled to no
support whatsoever. GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 70, § 9.03, at 312.
89 See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67
87

GEO. WASH.

L. REV. 1207, 1214 (1999) (observing that the McGuire case "illus-

trate[s] the contours of the common law doctrine of family privacy."); Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting The Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing The
MarriageContract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 456 (1998) (noting that "courts have traditionally abstained from intervening in conduct during marriage and this has not
changed with the no-fault revolution.")
90 HARTOG, supra note 66, at 320 n. 7 (quoting trial transcript).
91

Id.

59 N.W.2d at 338.
That the McGuire court interpreted the requirement of discontinuing
cohabitation both literally and narrowly may be inferred from its favorable reference to cases from other states in which a wife had successfully obtained
spousal maintenance even though she continued to live the marital home. 59
92
93
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tom, the court entered a legal judgment about the sharp
boundary between the state and the family, although the borderland between these two institutions was about to become a far
94
more contested terrain.
Occasionally, a court would soften its stance on the husband's prerogatives and introduce a note of realism into its reasoning. As a rule, the husband had the right to choose the
family's place of domicile. 95 It was the wife's duty "'to go with
her husband to the home which he had provided.' ,,96 If the wife
refused to accompany her husband, she was deemed to have
abandoned him. 97 In Eftimiou v. Eftimiou,98 husband and wife
N.W.2d at 340-342. The distinction was subtle but key: the parties in those
cases were living apart, even within the marital domicile, while the McGuires
were still cohabiting. Id.
94 Another view of the case suggests that the trial court simply intruded
too far into the domestic arrangements.
The district court decreed that the plaintiff was legally entitled to use
the credit of the defendant and obligate him to pay for certain items in
the nature of improvements and repairs, furniture, and appliances for
the household in the amount of several thousand dollars; required the
defendant to purchase a new automobile with an effective heater
within 30 days; ordered him to pay travel expenses of the plaintiff for a
visit to each of her daughters at least once a year; that the plaintiff be
entitled in the future to pledge the credit of the defendant for what
may constitute necessaries of life; awarded a personal allowance to the
plaintiff in the sum of $50 a month; awarded $800 for services for the
plaintiff's attorney; and as an alternative to part of the award made,
defendant was permitted, in agreement with plaintiff, to purchase a
modern home elsewhere.
59 N.W.2d at 336. Even the dissenting Justice, who maintained that the equitable power of a trial court did extend to the relief sought by Lydia McGuire,
would have limited the award to a modest cash amount. 59 N.W.2d at 345 (Yeager, J., dissenting).
95
See, e.g., Vetrano v. Vetrano, 54 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County, 1945) (noting "the well-settled principle of law that the domicile of the
wife is the place where the husband has his domicile").
96
Id., quoting Downes v. Downes, 225 App.Div. 886, 233 N.Y.S. 39, 40
(2d Dep't 1929).
97 See Bennett v. Bennett, 79 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1951) ("The doctrine is
well established that the husband, being the head of the family and legally responsible for its support, has the right to choose and establish the domicile for
himself and his wife, and when he provides a new domicile, his wife's refusal to
follow him constitutes desertion, unless the change is plainly unreasonable.")
This rule that a married woman's domicile was ordinarily that of her husband
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each sought a judgment of separation based on abandonment by
the other. Despite his ownership of "approximately twelve
houses," the husband insisted on the couple's residing in a ratinfested cellar with no toilet and no hot water. 99 When his wife
declined to accept these conditions, Mr. Eftimiou asserted that
"she would be required to live in a sewer" if he so chose.10 0 In
the court's view, the husband's "exercise in the selection of the
place of abode is not an arbitrary power. He must exercise his
right in a reasonable manner with due respect for his wife's
health, welfare, comfort and peace of mind."10 1 The court
granted a judgment of separation in favor of the wife and dismissed the husband's counterclaim, noting that "the assault on
the citadel of the husband's supremacy is proceeding in these
days apace, so that today the wife is no longer in complete subju102
gation to the dictates of her husband.
But a wife who attended college and intended to pursue
medical studies was deemed "a very ambitious lady" and failed
to evoke similar judicial solicitude. 10 3 Because she had neglected
to keep Jewish dietary laws in the home and had paid less attention to her daughter than her husband thought appropriate, she
was found to have constructively abandoned her husband and to
have breached her duty to the child. 10 4 The court's reliance on
gender norms for its ruling was explicit: "The father has a right to
expect the mother to give the child that which is necessary for
her development and good, as it is his duty to provide the means
was abrogated in Maryland in 1972 by an amendment to the state constitution.
See Blount v. Boston, 718 A.2d 1111, 1124 n.5 (Md., 1998) (explaining the impact of the state equal rights amendment). In New York, the Domestic Relations Law was amended in 1976 to provide that the "domicile of a married man
or woman shall be established for all purposes without regard to sex." L. 1976,
Ch. 62, § 2. The modern view on whether desertion has occurred depends on
the justification for one spouse's decision to establish a new marital residence
and the other's justification for refusing to follow. See Kerr v. Kerr, 371 S.E.2d
30 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
98 204 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960).
99 Id. at 786.
100 Id. at 789.
101 Id. at 790.
102 204 N.Y.S. 2d at 790.
103 Rosner v. Rosner, 108 N.Y.S.2d 196, 200 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens
County 1951).
104

Id. at 201.
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to effectuate
10 5
spiritually."

that, both

materially

and

in

cooperation

C. The Symbiosis of Marriage and Divorce
Americans have always believed in a "fundamental right to
marry, and marry, and marry. ' 10 6 In the 1950s and 1960s, this
view of marital freedom required easy divorce, which was theoretically unavailable. Indeed, in the world limned by appellate
court opinions, divorce came at the end of bitter litigation in
which "innocent" spouses proved marital "fault" in an adversary
proceeding against their erring partners, whereupon the state
"punished" the "guilty" spouses by issuing a divorce decree. In
1955, the Tennessee Supreme Court forcefully articulated this set
of legal norms:
Divorce in this state is not a matter to be worked out for the mutual
accommodation of the parties in whatever manner they may desire, or
in whatever manner the Court may deem to be fair and just under the
circumstances. It is conceived as a remedy for the innocent against the
guilty. The unfortunate person against whom a divorce is granted may
suffer not only the severance of his or her marital relations, but also
the deprivation of those rights, such as alimony, which arise out of the
marital relation. These provisions thus are intended to further the pol107
icy of rewarding the innocent and punishing the guilty.

No matter how ponderously the high court recapitulated the formal canon, however, divorce had by the 1950s already become "a
matter to be worked out for the mutual accommodation of the
parties in whatever manner they may desire. ' 10 8 The drive to
escape bad marriages pushed American couples to pinnacles of
legal invention, and divorce courts followed their lead. 10 9 Of the
three most prevalent divorce grounds, adultery, desertion, and
105 Id. The same gendered norms underlay the "tender years" presumption, by which the custody of young children was typically awarded to their
mothers on grounds of natural fitness. See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 70,
§ 11.03[B][1], at 461. This presumption gradually yielded to facially genderneutral custody rules in the 1970s. Id.
106 Mary Ann Glendon, The New Marriageand the New Property, in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES: AREAS OF LEGAL,

59, 63 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Fetz
eds., 1980).
107
Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tenn. 1955) (citation omitted).
108 Id.
109 See generally DiFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE, supra note 51.
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHANGE
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cruelty, it was the third which became the "dazzling success

stor[y] of family law" 110 because its plasticity allowed it rapidly to
outpace adultery and desertion as the favored vehicle for dissolution. In the 1860s, cruelty accounted for only one-eighth of all
decrees; by 1922, it had emerged as the most popular ground. In
1950, divorces and annulments premised on cruelty accounted
for 58.7% of the total, while desertion had slipped to 17.6%, and
adultery registered merely 2.7%.111
But what constituted cruelty? By the decade before the nofault divorce revolution, cruelty had been transformed into no
more and no less than a way for the couple to opt out of an unworkable marriage.1 12 Far from restricting divorce, the fault system operated as a moral charade, fooling no one but staying in
place for want of a cultural alternative. Noted judge and divorce
reformer Paul W. Alexander well understood the paradox:
"[T]he trouble with guilt as a criterion is . . . [that it] virtually

assures mutual consent as a ground for divorce.

'113

The pliant

cruelty standard rarely foreclosed any consensual divorce, as
long as the parties agreed on the legal story to be presented in
court. 114 Professor Homer H. Clark, Jr. was describing the
110 Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues for Divorce?
From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 79-80 (1976).
111 JACOBSON, supra note 10, at 121 tbl.58.
112 DIFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE, supra note 51, at 43-75 (describing the radical transition in the legal understanding of cruelty).
113 JOHN S. BRADWAY, ED., PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF FAMILY
LAW 179 (1959) (quoting Judge Paul W. Alexander).
114
Divorce-minded New York couples were statutorily barred from concocting fables of matrimonial cruelty. So they became versed in three alternative strategies: (1) migratory divorces for those able to afford six weeks in
Nevada or some other divorce-friendly venue; (2) annulments for those wishing
to engage in the fiction that their marriages never legally occurred; and (3)
staged hotel adultery. See generally Richard H. Wels, New York: The Poor
Man's Reno, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 303 (1950). The last of these options consisted
of nothing less than routinized off-Broadway productions calling for "the husband to be caught in the act of sitting beside a scantily clad correspondent when
the wife, a process server, and a private detective.., burst into the hotel room."
DiFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE, supra note 51, at 89. Indeed, so endemic
was this procedure that the rare judge who refused to accept the faked hotel
evidence would "not be long hearing divorce cases." Max Rheinstein, Our
Dual Law of Divorce: The Law in Action Versus the Law of the Books, in THE
LAW SCHOOL, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE 41
(1952).
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ancien regime of divorce in Colorado, but his words applied to
the whole country: "Colorado ... permits the parties to obtain

divorces by consent, but subjects them to [the] humiliation, hypocrisy, sometimes perjury, and needless hostility of having to

testify to one of the prescribed grounds." 115 In short, the legal
culture was recognizing a plain if difficult truth about marriage.
As the Idaho Supreme Court observed in 1953, an irretrievably
broken marriage, immune to reconciliation and shorn of its identity as a family unit, cannot be fixed by rule of law or by author116

ity of the state.
Divorces are a product of our cultural assumptions about
marriage.1 1 7 Even in the domestic apogee of the 1950s and
1960s, the American legal system was universally acknowledged
as a failure at limiting divorce. 118 Indeed, a culture tolerant of
divorce lived side by side with its marital counterpart. Charlton
115

L.

REV.

riod, see

Homer H. Clark, Jr., Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO.
403, 407 (1971). On the farcical nature of divorce litigation in this pe-

A HISTORY OF DiStates 1-8 (1962) (observing that under a fault-based

NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO:

VORCE IN THE UNITED

system of divorce, thousands have had to "resort to some type of make-believe"
to have the sour marriage dissolved); Paul Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy:
Specific Groundsfor Divorce, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 26, 27 (1953) (stating that divorce litigation is the one striking exception to the rule that the defendant tries to prevent the plaintiff from succeeding).
116 Howay v. Howay, 264 P.2d 691, 697 (Ida. 1953); see also DeBurgh v.
DeBurgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1952). ("[W]hen a marriage has failed and the
family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served
and divorce will be permitted.")
117

See David L. Cohn, Are Americans Polygamous?,

ATLANTIC

Aug. 1947, at 30, 32:
We teach our young that to be married is automatically to be happy.
We believe that everybody is, ought to be, or can be made happy; that
all are "entitled" to happiness as to fresh air.... But simultaneously,
in our anarchy of impermanence, we believe that if we are not happy
in one marriage we shall surely be happy in another.

MONTHLY,

See also Christopher Lasch, Divorce American Style, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17,
1966, at 3, 4 ("Easy divorce is a form of social insurance that has to be paid by a
society which holds up domesticity as a universally desirable condition .... ").
118 See generally DiFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE, supra note 51, ch.
4, "The Case of the All-Too-Consenting Adults" (describing the widely-acknowledged failures of the fault system of divorce); see also Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, supra note 115, at 403 ("Anyone acquainted with
American marriage and divorce law cannot help but be struck with the fre-
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Ogburn, vice-chair and counsel for the Interprofessional Commission of Marriage and Divorce Laws, expressed his dismay in
1950 that the American public "remained rather apathetic in the
face of the disturbing character of the divorce evil: the increasing
number of divorces and the laxity of the courts in hearing and
granting divorces, especially in undefended cases often based on
fraud and collusion in violation of the statutes." 119 But Ogburn
had a poor grasp of the zeitgeist. The public did not loudly tout
divorce, but it certainly abided it as the remedy for failed marriage and as the only way to re-enter the happiness sweepstakes.
Social researcher Maxine B. Virtue's 1956 observation that the
"present cultural mores generally disapprove of the spouse who
does not co-operate when asked for a divorce" 120 more accurately captured the flavor of a culture which understood the need
for flexibility in negotiating the ideal of marriage.
In postwar America, what earlier generations had viewed as
the "natural" rights of men became codified as legal entitlements. 121 Women "lost significant legal protections" as the legal
power of men increased. 122 By the end of the 1950s, however,
fissures started to appear in the patriarchal, neo-Victorian
fagade. People began to postpone marriage and to bear fewer
children. 123 Beginning in 1962, annual rates of divorce rose
markedly. 124 There was a dawning realization that neither the
economy nor the individual family benefited by keeping women
confined at home. 125 By the early 1960s, fresh from the hearths
and cradles of this golden age of domesticity, educated, middleclass Americans prepared to unveil "the latest and most revolu126
tionary version yet of the modern family."
quency and emotional fervor of the criticisms leveled at that branch of the law
over the last 40 years.")
119 Charlton Ogburn, The Role of Legal Services in Family Stability, 272
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

(1950).
120

MAXINE B. VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN COURT

121

Nelson, supra note 50, at 523.

122

Id. at 524.

123

SKOLNICK,

124

CHERLIN,

125

supra note 11, at 73-74.
supra note 49, at 22.
SKOLNICK, supra note 11, at 74.

126

14

229-30 (1956).

127
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II. How Marriage Has Changed (and Not
Changed) Over the Past Half-Century and
Why It Matters
In considering the cultural and legal developments that have
had the greatest impact on marriage in the past half century, the
dramatic rise in divorce rates in the wake of the passage of nofault divorce laws has often taken center stage. Between 1965
and 1980, the divorce rate more than doubled, from 2.5 divorces
per 1,000 Americans to 5.2 divorces. 127 Even though the rate
then began to drop significantly, many cultural critics argued that
America was drifting into a "divorce culture" 128 aimed at "the
abolition of marriage, ' 12 9 to cite the titles of two popular books
from the late 1990s.
A. How No-Fault Divorce Changed Marriage
No-fault divorce came to life in the late 1960s as a major
effort to retard the rise in divorce, not to liberate couples willynilly from their conjugal obligations. No-fault divorce laws were
originally designed to reduce acrimony, improve the chances of
reconciliation, and thereby reduce the divorce rate. They failed.
But what ensued owed more to the law of unintended consequences than to any legal design to destroy marriage, as critics
127 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, Table 72. Live Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Divorces: 1950 to 2003, at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2O05pubs/O6statab/vitstat.pdf.
128 BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997).
Whitehead's book had its genesis in her influential 1993 article, Dan Quayle
Was Right, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 47. In that piece, Whitehead argued that
Americans in the 1970s largely destigmatized divorce because the mores had
shifted from protecting children's well-being to pursuing adult happiness. Id. at
52. Divorce became merely an escape hatch from a tumultuous relationship.
But her review of social science studies reflecting the serious damage to children of divorce concluded that "growing up in an intact two-parent family is an
important source of advantage for American children." Id. at 80.
129 MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE (1996). Gallagher's thesis was apocalyptic: The overthrow of the marriage culture and its replacement by a postmarital culture was
responsible for most of the gravest problems facing America-crime, poverty,
welfare dependence, homelessness, educational stagnation, even child abuse.
Above all, the decline of marriage was behind the precarious sense of economic
instability haunting many Americans. Id. at 3-4.
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have often claimed. 130 The operating principles of the regime
governing marital dissolution in the 1950s and 1960s were formally dependent on proof of fault grounds, but operationally reliant on mutual consent. No-fault divorce a decade later was
revolutionary not because it eliminated grounds, but because it
effected unilateral divorce.
Beginning at the end of the 1960s in California, the standard
of "irreconcilable differences"' 1 31 or its equivalent, "irretrievable
breakdown,"'132 triggered a nationwide overhaul in the process of
obtaining a divorce. By 1985, all states had adopted some version of no-fault divorce. Some 35 states enacted an "irreconcilable differences"-type provision, either adding it to their menu of
dissolution options, or wiping the slate clean of all fault-based
divorce grounds. The remaining states provided a no-fault divorce ground to be established by couples living separate and
apart for a specified time. 133 The no-fault divorce revolution
converted the operational mechanism of divorce from mutual
consent to unitary action. In most jurisdictions the legal system
effectively exchanged the culpability theory of divorce for one of
marital breakdown. But irreconcilable differences are simply not
justiciable. The "virtually universal understanding [came to be]

In California, the Governor's Commission on the Family which devised
no-fault divorce was appointed in 1966 to mount a "concerted assault on the
high incidence of divorce in our society and its often tragic consequences." REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 1 (1966) (quoting
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Charge to the Commission, May 11, 1966). See
James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage,75 IND. L.J. 875, 885 (2000) ("the
history of no-fault divorce illustrates the gulf between founding intentions and
achieved effects: the major family law reforms ...in the 1960s and 1970s were
carefully considered efforts aimed at reinforcing the family and lowering the
rate of divorce. They largely failed."); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 60-61, 78-79,
101-03, 162-73 (1988) (arguing that no-fault divorce law reforms were not
widely intended or expected to radically alter either marriage or divorce).
131 Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314-51 (repealed 1994).
132 Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A past I U.L.A. 159 (1998) (originally proposed 1970).
133 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 70, § 8.01[C], at 238.
130
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that the breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable if one spouse
says it is."'134 And, increasingly, one spouse said it was.
What happened to marriage in the age of no-fault? The
metamorphosis of divorce into an act of self-actualization was
but one component in an emerging ethos featuring "personal autonomy with respect to intimate life choices. 1 35 The dislodgment of a formal culpability analysis in divorce cases was
accompanied by cultural rifts in American society "leav[ing] the
'136
individual suspended in glorious, but terrifying, isolation.
Family law appeared now to foster "autonomous individualism"
to the detriment of familial relationships. 137 With divorce at the
ready, marriage no longer appeared to require continual tending.
"Love," as the posters advertising the wildly popular 1970 movie
Love Story endlessly repeated, "means never having to say
'138
you're sorry.
And so the bonds of marriage weakened. No-fault divorce
changed marriage as much as it changed divorce. The move to
unilateral dissolution was not, of course, the sole cause for the
demise of marriage as a perceived universal boon. Our culture is
too diverse, too variable, too atomistic. 139 In 1940, the Census
Bureau classified a male head of household residing with his wife
134

MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW:

AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES

81 (1987); see also

WHITE-

HEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE, supra note 128, at 68 (no-fault divorce "estab-

lished a disaffected spouse's right unilaterally to dissolve a marriage simply by
declaring that the relationship was over").
135 Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault. Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 62 (1991).
136

ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND

6 (1985)
Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 3. But see Naomi R. Cahn, The
Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 270 ("Individuals
continue to want a familial relationship; they simply want more control over the
terms of that relationship. This movement toward personal autonomy is nonetheless a movement toward relationships, not away from them.")
138 ERICH SEGAL, LOVE STORY 131 (1970).
139 See generally MILTON C. REGAN, ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE
MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999) (exploring the tensions between spouses as
separate individuals with their own aims, and marital partners committed to the
joint goals of their union).
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE
137

Vol 21, 2008

History of Contemporary Marriage

as a "normal" family. 140 But married-couple households have
been losing statistical ground for decades. They occupied 78% of
the nation's households in 1950, 60% in 1980, and 52.8% in 2000.
The number of unmarried partners living together grew tenfold
between 1960 and 2000, and 72% between 1990 and 2000. Today,
"to be married means to be outnumbered. 1 4 1 Results of the
American Community Survey, which questioned occupants of 3
million American households in 2005, revealed that unmarried
adults headed up 50.3% of the nation's housing units that year,
while married couples occupied 49.7% .142 Statistics released in
September 2007 by the Census Bureau reveal a startling increase
of 10 million in the population of unmarried adults in the preced43
ing year. These now number 100 million.
Although divorce rates have received the lion's share of
popular and scholarly attention, the substantial declines in the
rates for marriages and for births are perhaps more telling as
markers of cultural change. As Table 1 on the following page
shows, the divorce rate rose sharply beginning in the late 1960s,
peaking in 1980 and then receding significantly, although remaining considerably above the rate before no-fault. The marriage
rate varied within a range of 8.5 to 10.6% during the four decades following 1955. However, the rate has since markedly declined, to 7.4% in 2007.144 By contrast, the birth rate has
15, at 182.
Sam Roberts, To Be Married Means to Be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2006, at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/us/15census.html (capitalization altered).
142 Id. Information on the American Community Survey is available at
U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/index.html.
143 Thomas F. Coleman, Ranks of Unmarried Adults Reach 100 Million
Mark, Column One, Sep. 17, 2007, at http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/column-one/09-17-07-census-report.htm. Earlier, more detailed census figures reveal the following: There were 219,699,000 Americans aged 18 or older in 2006.
Of those, 122,784,000, or 55.9%, were married. The unmarried population constituted 96,916,000, or 44.1%. The latter grouping consists of those widowed,
divorced, and separated, 41,576,000 (18.9%); and the never-married, 55,340,000
(25.2%). U. S. Census Bureau, America's Families and Living Arrangements:
2006, Table Al. Marital Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 2006, at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html.
144 See also Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, Marriage and Divorce
Since World War II: Analyzing the Role of Technological Progresson the Forma140

141

CoTT, supra note
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Table 1: Births, Marriages, and Divorces, 19502007: Rate per 1,000 Population145
Year
1950

Births
24.1

Marriages
11.1

Divorces
2.6

1955

25.0

9.3

2.3

1960

23.7

8.5

2.2

1965
1970
1975

19.4
18.4
14.6

9.3
10.6
10.0

2.5
3.5
4.8

1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

15.9
15.8
16.7
14.6
14.4

10.6
10.1
9.8
8.9
8.3

5.2
5.0
4.7
4.4
4.1

2005

14.0

7.7

3.7

2006

14.0

7.6

3.6

2007

14.3

7.4

3.6

followed a fairly steady course, with only slight deviations. It fell

from a 1955 high of 25% to a 2005 low of 14%, a decline of 44%
during the half-century, before registering a small rise to 14.3%
in 2007.
These demographic trends illustrate the cultural swing away

146
from marriage. Marriage "has been facing more competition"
tion of Households, Working Paper 10772, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
Sep. 2004, at 1, at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/econ/CAEI
RESEARCH,
guner.pap.pdf(analyzing data to conclude that, out of non-widows between the
ages of 18 to 64, in 1950 there were 211 marriages per 1,000 unmarried women
as compared with just 82 in 2000).
145 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1443, 1453. That laws regulating households would be required to encompass a
great number of these alternatives to conjugality was signaled by the Supreme
Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-499 (1977) (holding
that a statute limiting household occupancy was unconstitutional because it
intruded upon "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family").
146 Roberts, supra note 141.
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becoming "just one of several permissible choices for individuals
who wish to pursue an intimate relationship within the frame47
work of the law."'1
Not only are fewer Americans marrying, but their unions are
less stable. First marriages for women during the peak of the
Baby Boom lasted longer than recent marriages. Of the first marriages for women from 1955 to 1959, approximately 79% marked
their fifteenth anniversary, compared with only 57% for women
who wed for the first time from 1985 to 1989.148
B. Marriage: An Optional Intimate Association
In 1955, marriage in America was the sine qua non of intimate pairings: "Never have women and men looked so exclu-

sively to one relationship for the satisfaction of their needs, their
wishes, their secret dreams, and their spoken aspirations.' 1 4 9 But
today those needs, wishes, dreams, and aspirations are fulfilled in

many types of personal associations, or even in managing solo. 150
This should not be surprising. The companionship marriage has
generated options involving more companionship and less mar-

riage, since the "very factors that have made marriage more satisfying in modern times have also made it more optional.

' 151

The

147 Source for the years 1950-2000: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2007, Table 76. Live Births, Deaths, Marriages, and
Divorces: 1950 to 2004, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/07statab/vitstat.pdf. Source for the years 2005-2007 (measured by 12-month periods ending
in March), U. S. Department of Health and Human Resources, Centers for
Disease Control, National Vital Statistical Reports (Oct. 30, 2007), Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: ProvisionalData for March 2007, Table A. Provisional vital statistics for the United States, March 2007, at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_04.pdf.
148 Most People Make Only One Trip Down the Aisle, But FirstMarriages
Shorter, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. Census Bureau News, Sep. 17, 2007, at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/marital-status_
living-arrangements/010624.html.
149 LANDIS, supra note 1, at v.
150 Slightly more than one-quarter of all households (26%) consisted of a
person living alone in 2006, up from 17% in 1970. U. S. Census Bureau, SingleParent Households Showed Little Variation Since 1994, Census Bureau Reports,
Mar. 27, 2007, at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/
families-households/009842.html.
151
Stephanie Coontz, For Better, For Worse: MarriageMeans Something
Different Now, WASH. POST, May 1, 2005, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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last half-century has witnessed a virtual end to the stigma of illegitimacy and single parenthood, as well as a significant change in
the status of women, allowing for the wider possibility of female
52
economic self-sufficiency.'
Developments in reproductive technology, matched-if tardily-by cultural acceptance and legal sanction, have succeeded
in largely "separat[ing] sex and childbearing.' 1 53 American society has moved past the freedom to have sex without reproduc154
tion, and now considers the freedom to reproduce without sex.

Assisted reproductive technology ("ART") emerged in the 1970s
and has tremendously increased in complexity and effective-

ness. 155 The benefits of ART have spread to many infertile
Even at the
wp-dyn/content/article2005/04/30/AR2005043000108_pf.html.
height of America's love affair with marriage, observers worried that the "companionship marriage, built on an individualistic basis, promises much - perhaps
too much." LANDIS, supra note 1, at 524. A quick glance at the recent popular
bookshelf suggests widespread belief in marriage as dispensable. See, e.g., EMILY DUBBERLEY, I'D RATHER BE SINGLE THAN SETrLE: SATISFIED SOLITUDE
AND How TO ACHIEVE IT (2007); ROSANNA HERTZ, SINGLE BY CHANCE,
MOTHERS BY CHOICE: How WOMEN ARE CHOOSING PARENTHOOD WITHOUT
MARRIAGE AND CREATING THE NEW AMERICAN FAMILY (2006); JEN SCHEFFT,
BETTER SINGLE THAN SORRY: A No-REGRETS GUIDE TO LOVING YOURSELF
AND NEVER SETrLING (2007); LOUISE SLOAN, KNOCK YOURSELF UP: No
MAN? No PROBLEM:

A

TELL-ALL GUIDE TO BECOMING A SINGLE MOM

(2007).
See Janet Radcliffe Richards, Metaphysics for the MarriageDebate, 42
DIEGO L. REV. 1125, 1134-35 (2005). "Sex before marriage is normal,
childbearing by single women and unmarried couples is no longer much condemned, men can be held responsible for the support of their children irrespective of whether they are married, and married couples can deal with their tax
and incomes separately." Id. at 1135.
153 Id.
154 See generally GREGORY, ET AL. supra note 70, § 5.07, at 163-181.
152

SAN

155 See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive
Technology): Should the Law Protect Them From Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
57, 57. Donor insemination efforts in the 1950s and 1960s were "viewed with
such horror that bills were introduced in state legislatures to ban the procedure." Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 36 (2000). By the end of the twentieth century,
some 35 states had adopted laws facilitating artificial insemination procedures
by declaring the consenting husband of the sperm recipient to be the legal father. Id. The development of in vitro fertilization in the 1970s was similarly
greeted initially with horror, then tolerated, now widespread. Id. at 36-40.
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couples, gay and lesbian couples, and single parents. 156 Collaborative reproduction "is forcing a redefinition of family" by "making a biological distinction between gestation and genetics in
determining parentage as well as a consideration of intentionality
57
in defining the family."'
Same-sex couples have clearly not achieved equal treatment,
either culturally or legally, but they have made tremendous
strides in the past few years. 158 The increase in the reported
number of same-sex couples has also been dramatic. 15 9 The
modern family can no longer be narrowly construed as an association between a breadwinner and a homemaker. Instead, the
concept now encompasses a collection of diverse, often fragile
Rosato, supra note 155.
Andrews & Elster, supra note 155, at 46. See also Michael J. Malinowski, A Law-Policy Proposalto Know Where Babies Come From During the Reproduction Revolution, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 549 (2006) (noting that
developments in artificial reproduction are expanding parental choice not only
about whether to have children but also about their offspring's genetic charac156
157

teristics). See generally JANET L. DOLGIN,

DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECH-

NOLOGY AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997).
158 See. e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004) (providing

legal recogni-

tion for domestic partnerships, unions of "two adults who have chosen to share
one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring."); Goodridge v. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (declaring the state may not "deny the protections, benefits and obligations
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to
marry."); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d. 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding that committed
same-sex couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and benefits
enjoyed by opposite-sex couples under the civil marriage statutes). In December 2006, the New Jersey Legislature passed a civil union law, complying with
the state supreme court mandate. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-1 to -12 (West
2007). Same-sex couples are not, of course, winning all the battles. See, e.g.,
GREGORY, ET AL.,

supra note 70, § 2.08, at 52-54 (discussing the Defense of

Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), denying federal recognition to same-sex
marriage, as well as state laws to the same effect); Chambers v. Ormiston, 935
A.2d. 956 (R.I. 2007) (holding that a Rhode Island family court is not empowered to divorce a same-sex couple who had been married in Massachusetts).
159 The 2000 U.S. Census reported 601,209 total gay and lesbian families.
This total included 304,148 gay male families, and 297,061 lesbian families. In
1990, the U.S. Census Bureau reported 145,130 total gay and lesbian families
(81,343 male, and 63,787 female). The statistics for 2000 represent a 314% increase. DAVID M. SMITH & GARY J. GATES, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN
THE UNITED STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS

3 (2001),

at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000491-l-partner-households.pdf.
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domestic arrangements that comprise the so-called postmodern
family-single mothers, blended families, cohabiting couples, lesbian and gay partners, communes, and two-job families as well as
adoptive families and those with extended family members rais160
ing children.
Some couples seek to enter the bastion of marriage and are
barred from doing so. Others consciously forego the enumerated
rights and privileges enshrined therein. But however these nontraditional amalgamations choose to define themselves, they exist within a state that is charged with recognizing and interpreting
the implications of their familial relationships. 161 Thus, while the
postmodern family resists the dictates of traditional models, it
still needs the state to intervene when its constituents demand
rights and entitlements that are no longer self-evident. One of
the nuclear family's virtues is its social and legal predictability.
Nontraditional families challenge the state to identify and apportion rights and entitlements in radically novel contexts. Often,
however, the only time-tested precedents available for evaluating
these new relationships are the very norms and assumptions that
contemporary families seek to evade.
C. How Marriage Has Not Changed

Many family law scholars point to changes in gender norms
as a significant feature of recent history.1 62 True enough, clearlydifferentiated gender roles pervaded marriage: "husbands were
economic providers, disciplinarians, and the heads of families,
while wives were nurturers, caretakers, and subservient to their
husbands."'1 63 Social changes beginning in the 1970s worked the
gears of the legal system to erase laws which mandated gender
See generally JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEw FAMILIES: STORIES OF DoMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE-TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1998).
161 See GREGORY, ET AL., supra note 70, § 2.02, at 25 (discussing "Consensual Alternatives to Marriage").
162 See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 189, 194 (2007) ("Family law scholars have praised the family law revolution that, over the past forty years, has eliminated most official gender role
distinctions within the family.")
163 Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2; see also CoTr, supra note 15, at 7 ("Marriage decisively differentiated the positions of husband and wife.").
160
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roles. 164 The norm has shifted away from a "breadwinnner/
breadmaker marriage. 1'

65

But not too far.

Gendered norms remain pervasive, often buttressed by marketplace differentiation. In 1979, women who were full-time
wage and salary workers earned 63% of what their male counter-

parts earned. In 2005, the ratio had diminished, with women
earning 81% as much as men did. 166 But these gains were far

from uniform. Women and men "tend to work in different managerial and professional occupations."' 1 67 In 2005, among professional and related occupations, women were much less likely

than men to work in some of the highest paying fields, such as
engineering and computer and mathematical occupations. Instead, women were more likely to be employed in lower paying

professional occupations, such as education, training, and library
occupations. 168 While 14% of men earned $1,500 or more per
week, only 6% of women did. 169 College-educated men working
full-time earn an average of $62,000, which is more than 25%
more than their female counterparts, who earn $46,000.170
164

See, e.g., LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING

CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY

60-61 (2006). These changes in-

clude the elimination of different rules for women and men for purposes of
alimony, child custody, property management, and estate oversight. Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 113 (2005). As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the principle, "neither federal nor state government
acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy
denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship statureequal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society
based on their individual talents and capacities." United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
165

The phrase is June Carbone's.

JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO

PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW xiv (2000).
166 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HIGH.

2005 at 1 (Sep. 2006), at http://www.bls.gov/
cps/cpswom2005.pdf. The gender gap was smallest among younger workers.
Among workers 25 to 34 years old, women earned 89% as much as men, and
among 16- to 24-year-olds, the earnings ratio rose to 93%. Id.
LIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN

167

Id.

168

Id. at 2.

169

Id.

170 American Association of University Women, Women's Educational
Gains and the Gender Earnings Gap (2007), at http://www.aauw.org/research/
statedata/. Wage differences between the genders are found almost immedi-
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Gender norms continue to regulate the division of labor between parents, which resembles that of previous generations:
Motherhood and fatherhood affect careers differently. Mothers are
more likely than fathers (or other women) to work part time, take
leave, or take a break from the work force-factors that negatively
affect wages. Among women who graduated from college in 1992-93,
more than one-fifth (23 percent) of mothers were out of the work
force in 2003, and another 17 percent were working part time. Less
than 2 percent of fathers were out of the work force in 2003, and less
than 2 percent were working part time. On average, mothers earn less
than women without children earn, and both groups earn less than
17 1
men earn.

Personal choices are intertwined with economic choices and consequences, and they are still firmly rooted in gender. In the middle of the previous century, a man's "thrift and industry" 172

mattered as much as a woman's "domestic skills, ' 173 but the perception was that the difference in gender norms was diminishing.
A 1953 text downplayed the economic motive for marriage, arguing that "a single woman can support herself as well as the average husband would support her. ' 174 Yet the cultural roles based
on gender persisted. A woman needed to accommodate more to

marriage than a man:
The man goes to shop or office after marriage the same as he did
before, and even though he comes home to his own home instead of
this parental home or a rooming house, he still comes home as before
175
to someone who provides for his needs in food and rest.

ately, and worsen over time. One year after college graduation, women working full time earn only 80% as much as their male colleagues earn. Ten years
after college, women earn only 69% as much as men earn. JUDY GOLDBERG
DEY & CATHERINE HILL, BEHIND THE PAY GAP 2 (2007). In fact, the gender
gap among full-time employees "understates the real difference between women's and men's earnings" because it omits women who are working part time
or who are not in the labor force. Id. Female college graduates who eventually
return to full-time employment-as most do-will then have lower wages than
similarly-educated males, who have generally remained continuously employed,
further exacerbating the gender wage gap. Id.
171 DEY & HILL, supra note 170.
172 LANDIS, supra note 1, at 4.
173 Id.
174 BABER, supra note 2, at 163.
175

Id. at 173.
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A married woman in the6 labor force "is subject to the heavy

17
strain of double work."
Much has changed in this century, but much has not. The
difference between fatherhood and motherhood is still viewed as
"particularly stark. ' 177 The mores continue to insist that women
take the lioness' share in child care and housework, resulting in
the persistent division of labor described by Arlie Hochschild
and Ann Machung. 178 The gendered tasks of marriage result in

women working approximately an extra month each year, in
179
terms of chores focused on home and children.

176 Id. at 174. See also LANDIS, supra note 1, at 275 (observing in 1955 that
the birth of children results in far more difficult adjustments for women than for
men); WINCH, supra note 21, at 411 (reporting in 1963 the general view that "in
the American family the wife-mother fulfills the role of bandaging up the
skinned knees of her children and applying balm to the scarred psyches of her
husband and children," whether or not she is employed outside the home.)
177 DEY & HILL, supra note 170, at 3.
178

ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANN MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORK-

(1989). See also SCOTr COLEQUITY 53
(1996) (summarizing studies showing that, although men are taking a larger
share of domestic labor, "the majority of men still make only minimal contributions to those tasks conventionally performed by housewives, such as cooking
and cleaning."); Arlie Hochschild, The Fractured Family, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.
30, 2002, at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the-fractured-family
("we are living in a time of a stalled revolution, a time in which women have
changed much faster than the men they live with or the institutions in which
both sexes work. This has indeed marginalized family life and turned it into a
'second shift."').
179 HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 181, at 3, 82-83. See DEY &
HILL, supra note 170, at 3 (arguing that while twenty-first century motherhood
"entails substantial economic and personal sacrifices," fatherhood "appears to
engender a 'wage premium."' Men spend more time at work after the birth of
their children, while women do the reverse.); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000) (arguing that mass-cultural expectations that women be nurturing wives, mothers and daughters shape women's and society's
notion of women as "inauthentic workers"). But see Naomi R. Cahn, Gendered
Identities: Women and Household Work, 44 VILL. L. REV. 525, 526-528 (2000)
(arguing that pursuing the domestic tasks expected of them has afforded women a "household power base."). Recent findings suggest a more nuanced picture, concluding that "although the level in home production effort between
husbands and wives remains quite unequal, the increase in hours of home production that are related to additional children or decreases in the age of the
youngest child are shared much more equally between husbands and wives."
Michael A. Leeds & Peter von Allmen, Spousal Complementarity in Home ProING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME

TRANE, FAMILY MAN: FATHERHOOD, HOUSEWORK, AND GENDER
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Such inequities pervade not only the marriage but continue
to handicap women even after the marriage is over. Despite legislative efforts to reform property division upon divorce, the notion of marriage as an economic partnership has yet to be fully
endorsed by the trial courts. Rather than value "unwaged work
in the home" as equivalent to assets and contributions emanating
from "waged work, ' 180 lower courts seem predisposed to ignore
or to "minimize the homemaker spouse's contributions to the
marital economic partnership."' 8 1 At the same time, legislation
replacing alimony with a finite period of maintenance payments
has led to further financial disadvantage for women. In the trial
courts' view, limiting the duration of maintenance payments is a
justifiable inducement for recipients to become self-supporting as
rapidly as possible. The result is a persistent gender-based economic imbalance that, having germinated within the marriage,
survives to infect the post-divorce lives of women. The typical
division of labor in marriage is an extremely high risk proposition
for women, since "divorce renders a wife's investment almost
valueless, while the husband's investment retains its value in the
duction, AMER. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY (Oct. 2004), at http://findarticles.com/pl
articles/mi m0254/is_4_63/ain7072369. Another finding reports that although
the husbands of working women "have not assumed commensurate responsibilities in the home," most men and women "rate this arrangement as fair." Allen
M. Parkman, Bargaining over Housework: The FrustratingSituation of Secondary Wage Earners, 63 AMER. J. ECON. & SOCIOLOGY 765,766 (Oct. 2004), at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim0254/is 4 63/ain7072367
180 Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History
of Divorce Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 375, 441 n.266
(1988).
181

NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT

121 (1986). This attitude is both pervasive and continuing. See, e.g., Cynthia Lee
Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership,and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2005) (footnote omitted):
Many mothers have been stunned to learn that after years of viewing
themselves as proud and valuable contributors to marriage, to family,
to a new generation, the law of divorce views them as suckers. Surely
this is a mistake, a mother might insist, a confusion of identities, a
dialectical lapse that will be corrected as soon as it is discovered.
Sadly, there is no mistake. The dispiriting message is that primary
caretakers, the vast majority of whom are mothers, have been duped
into providing free family caretaking at great personal economic cost;
a price they must pay for their imprudent ways.
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paid labor market."182 Although studies vary, the most accepted
conclusion for the alterations in the post-divorce economic status
of men and women indicate a 30% average decline in women's
183
standard of living and a 10% improvement in men's.
D. Two Illustrations of the Altered Legal Environment

This brief section presents two examples showing matrimonial law's shift in the direction of favoring function over form.
Prenuptial contracts were once condemned because they suggested a commercial form for the marital unit. De facto parents
were entirely inconsistent with the classic family form. Yet both
functional elements gradually met with legal approval.
1. PrenuptialContracts: From Forbidden to Enforceable

At common law, a couple could specify certain dispositions
of property upon the death of a spouse, but never upon divorce. 184 Through a prenuptial agreement, the spouses could, for
example, provide for the care of orphaned relatives, direct that
one spouse receive more or less of the marital estate than required by law, or transfer a parcel of land from one to the other
in exchange for a waiver of future rights to the estate. 185 But any
effort to control post-marital economics in the event of divorce
was anathema. As a 1950s legal guidebook for marriage aptly
cautioned:
[a] farsighted but cynical couple cannot sit down on the eve of their
marriage and work out what alimony the wife is to get in the event
they are divorced and expect the courts to pay the slightest attention
to their agreement if in fact their marriage works out badly and they
186
separate.

For most of American history, states universally rejected
prenuptial contracts dictating the terms of post-divorce finances.
Such agreements were invalidated because they suggested the
contemplation of divorce at the very outset of a marriage. The
long-standing rule provided that even though the parties were
REGAN, supra note 139, at 155.
See Starnes, supra note 181, at 1504 n.134 (citing studies).
184 See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L.
141, 147-148 (1979).
185 PILPEL & ZAVIN, supra note 52, at 19.
186 Id. at 20-21.
182
183

REV.
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"competent to contract," in looking to "a future separation" such
a bargain violated public policy by "tending to encourage domestic feuds and broils."'1 87 The gendered nature of the "feuds and
broils" to be warded off was plainly stated in a nineteenth century decision: a premarital contract "gives a wife an interest in
disobedience, and renders her more independent by misconduct
than by the most strict observance of marriage duties. ' 18 8 An
appellate opinion over one hundred years later inverted the gender of the villain, but nonetheless retained the role stereotype.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals warned in 1964 that a prenuptial contract "could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his
wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary
1 89
liability would be limited."'
Underneath the choral judicial harmony, however, a few dissonant notes could be heard. In 1950, for example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decisively foreclosed a husband's attempt to enforce a premarital contract limiting his support obligations. 190
The majority opinion announced that it would "not look with
favor upon an agreement which may tend to permit a reservation
in the mind of the husband when he assumes the responsibility of
maintaining his spouse in such comfort as he is able to provide
and until his death or the law relieves him of it."' 191 The majority
then favorably cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion
that "'to sustain the claim of the husband ... would be to invest
him with a right to be both a faithless husband and a vicious citizen."1 92 But to dissenting Justice Timothy Brown, the Wisconsin
case presented more utilitarian concerns. He conceded that
"[p]ublic policy, of course, favors marriage and is concerned with
its stability,"'1 93 but he observed that, "in other relationships, con187 Wyant v. Lesher, 23 Pa. 338 (1854); see also Crouch v. Crouch, 385
S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (stating that "any antenuptial contract which
provides for, facilitates, or tends to induce, a separation or divorce of the parties after marriage, is contrary to public policy ... and ... void."). Crouch was
overruled in 1996. Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1996).
188 Wyant, 23 Pa. 338.
189 Crouch, 385 S.W.2d at 293.
190 Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 1950).

191

Id.

192

42 N.W.2d at 501, quoting In Re Moorehead's Estate, 132 A. 802, 806

(Pa. 1927).
193

42 N.W.2d at 503 (Brown, J. dissenting).
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tracts defining the expectations and responsibilities of the contracting parties promote stability. 1 94 Why, Justice Brown
wondered, is a principle which induces a settled state of affairs in
other relationships likely to "tend to promote discord in
1 95
marriage.
In 1968, when a Florida appellate decision followed precedent in invalidating a prenuptial agreement, a dissenting judge
indicated that the contract should have been upheld as "not in
1 96
contemplation of divorce, but in contemplation of marriage.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the lower
court dissent and held in Posner v. Posner that antenuptial agreements settling alimony and property rights upon divorce are not
void as contrary to public policy.1 97 The prevalence of divorce in
modern culture swayed the court. Since "no community or society" existed in which public policy "condemned a husband and
wife to a lifetime of misery as an alternative to the opprobrium of
divorce," prenuptial contracts have become appropriate planning
devices for couples, and public policy should allow their
98
enforcement.

Id.
195 Id. Justice Brown's concerns proved nettlesome for some justices when
the Wisconsin Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1958. The Court reaffirmed
its rule that prenuptial bargains implicating divorce were invalid. Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 92 N.W.2d 356 (Wis. 1958). In Caldwell, however, the court noted
that while "some members of the court" agreed with Justice Brown's Fricke
dissent, "we do not consider ourselves at liberty to reject the considered decision of our predecessors merely on that account, there having been no change
of conditions..." 92 N.W.2d at 361. Prenuptial contracting with respect to the
consequences of divorce was not permitted in Wisconsin until authorized by a
1977 statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.61(3)(L) (originally enacted as Sec. 41,
ch. 105, Laws of 1977).
196 Posner v. Posner, 206 So.2d 416, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (Swann,
J. dissenting), rev'd, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
197 Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
198 233 So.2d at 384 ("With divorce such a commonplace fact of life, it is
fair to assume that many prospective marriage partners whose property and
familial situation is such as to generate a valid antenuptial agreement settling
their property rights upon the death of either, might want to consider and discuss also-and agree upon, if possible-the disposition of their property and the
alimony rights of the wife in the event their marriage, despite their best efforts,
should fail."
194
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Posner proved to be the watershed decision in this area. 199

In the ensuing years, most courts have gravitated to the conclusion that there is "no reason not to allow persons about to enter
into a marriage the freedom to settle their rights in the event
their marriage should prove unsuccessful. ' ' 20 0 Another indication of the growing acceptance of pre-nuptial agreements is that
26 states and the District of Columbia have to date adopted the
1983 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which was created to
establish a framework for enforceable premarital agreements. 201
Prenuptial contracts finally "came into vogue by the end of the
1980s as an effective instrument for domestic relations. ' 20 2 Despite a recent call for reversion to the old rule of non-enforcement,20 3 it is doubtful that courts or legislatures will stand in the
20 4
way of the increasing popularity of these contractual devices.
2. Child Custody: From the Natural Parent to the De Facto
Parent

The English common law rendered nearly absolute control
of children to their father. 20 5 In a custody dispute with the child's
mother, the father always prevailed, unless he had abused, aban-

doned, or neglected the child. In the course of the nineteenth
199 Ten years before Posner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a prenuptial contract in which each spouse waived alimony rights upon divorce.
Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okl. 1960). Mysteriously, "the decision met
with virtual nonacceptance by other courts." Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d
810, 815 (Mass. 1981).
200 Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at 815.
201 See http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformactsfs-upaa.asp. Several other states regulate the execution and enforcement of
prenuptial contracts by statute. 7 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 581§ 1 (2007).
202 7 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 581§ 1 (2007).
203 Jeffrey G. Sherman, PrenuptialAgreements: A New Reason to Revive
an Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 384-393 (2005-2006) (describing prenuptial bargains as per se inequitable, and calling for their non-enforcement).
204 See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, PrenuptialContracts Find New Popularity,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9A04E3D7173EF932A1575BCOA961958260 (reporting that divorce lawyers are
stating that prenuptial agreements are "gaining in popularity even among the
not so fabulously wealthy and not so famous."); Bina Brown, Prenupsfor the
People, cnn.com, Jan. 4, 2007 at http://edition.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/01/04/
prenuptial.agreements/index.html (same).
205 CLARK, supra note 70, § 19.1, at 787.
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century, American courts began considering the welfare of the

20 6
child as a counterweight to the natural rights of the father.

Weighing a child's needs led judges to consider which parent
could supply the appropriate nurture. This approach came to
favor mothers, since raising children was a major part of women's culturally-created and legally-reinforced "separate
sphere. ' 20 7 By the twentieth century, courts routinely awarded
mothers custody of their children under the "tender years" presumption that children, especially young children, needed the

nurturing qualities with which all mothers were supposedly naturally imbued. But the maternal preference standard yielded in
the latter third of the twentieth century to a theoretically genderneutral assessment of the best interests of the child. In a

landmark child custody case in 1973, the New York Family Court
held that the "tender years" presumption violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States

Constitution.20 8 Changing mores about formal gender equality,
aided by judicial decisions outlawing many gender preferences in
other areas, led to a reconstitution of the best interest standard in
20 9
allocating child custody.
Different considerations apply when custody and visitation

disputes arise between so-called "natural" (biological or adoptive) parents and those who claim rights either as grandparents,
stepparents, or de facto parents. The general rule presumes that
206 See generally, Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.

L. REV. 1038 (1979).
207 See Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the
Primary CaretakerStandard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
291, 296 (1992).
208
State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). See
also Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (concluding that "the tender
years presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification
which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings
solely on the basis of sex.")
209
See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (Md. 1986) ("The best
interest of the child is therefore not considered as one of many factors, but as
the objective to which virtually all other factors speak."). But see Judith B.
Jennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman's World: Fathers' Rights to Child
Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (1991) (arguing that despite the
technical elimination of the maternal preference rule, in practice it is still applied in most courts).
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natural parents will prevail, absent a showing of unfitness. 21 0 But
this presumption has been challenged in a number of areas. Traditionally, grandparents had no visitation rights to their
grandchildren. A growing recognition of grandparents' roles in

2 11
children's upbringing can be traced back to the late 1970s.
Courts and legislatures have struggled with the appropriate role

of the state in negotiating the access to children sought by grandparents against the desires of a custodial parent. 212 Similar con213
siderations apply in mediating the role of stepparents.
The citadel of the biological/adoptive family has for some

years been besieged by the burgeoning segment of nontraditional
families. 214 Courts are gradually 215 -and legislatures more gradually stil12 16-recognizing the pervasiveness of alternative family
210 GREGORY, ET AL. supra note 70, § 11.03[B][2], at 463.
211 Sara Simrall Rorer, Grandparents'Visitation Rights in Ohio: A Procedural Quagmire, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 295, 296 (1987) ("Grandparent visitation
statutes are a recent development in statutory law, virtually unheard of ten to
fifteen years ago.").
212 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (striking down as unconstitutional a state statute allowing grandparents increased visitation to children
against mother's wishes).
213 See, e.g. Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing
stepfather to maintain physical custody of child and awarding father joint custody, even though trial court did not find the mother unfit).
214 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03, Reporter's Notes

cmts. b-c, at 228-32 (2002) [hereafter ALI,
DISSOLUTION] (citing cases).

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY

Id.; see also Janice M. v. Margaret K., 910 A.2d 1145 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2006) (holding that a mother's former lesbian partner is a de facto parent
entitled to visitation with the child the mother adopted during their
cohabitation).
216 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 403.270 (2004) (defining "de facto custodian" as "a person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to
have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has
resided with the person for [specified time periods];" and directing that in determining custody "equal consideration ... be given to each parent and to any
de facto custodian"); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1999) (detailing the rights of a
"person who establishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship"); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000) (statute providing same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to
married opposite-sex couples).
215
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forms by allocating legal rights and burdens to "equitable par217
ents" equivalent to biological and adoptive families.
A comprehensive treatment of this issue is beyond the scope
of this essay, but three state appellate opinions issued in 2007
exemplify the present trend embracing alternative family structures. The Maine Supreme Court ruled that a statute permitting
married couples to file a joint petition for adoption did not prohibit a joint adoption petition by an unmarried same-sex
couple. 218 Minnesota's highest court held that a mother's former
same-sex partner was properly awarded visitation with the children whom the mother-but not her partner-adopted during
their relationship.2 19 Finally, in a case tinged with clashing policies both old and new, the Virginia Court of Appeals enforced a
divorcing couple's agreement that the husband's spousal support
obligation would terminate upon the wife's cohabitation in a "situation analogous to marriage," in light of evidence which showed
that the wife was cohabiting with her female intimate partner. 220
The appellate court rejected the claim that the state's bans on
same-sex marriage, same-sex civil unions, partnership contracts,
or "other arrangements purporting to grant the privileges and
obligations of marriage" made it impossible to find a "situation
22
analogous to marriage" between same-sex partners. '

Epilogue: Unbundling The Elements of Marriage
The law's trajectory may be sinuous, but its overall direction
seems clear: American law and society is moving from sanctioning families grounded in biology and adoption to serving families
whose malleable composition is set by functional standards.
See J. Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family:
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001
BYU L. REV. 923, 933-935 (discussing the "equitable parent" doctrine). The
American Law Institute has proposed "a rule that allows continued contacts by
de facto parents whose participation in the child's life is important to the child's
welfare, without unnecessarily intruding on the autonomy of parents that is essential to the meaningful exercise of their responsibility." ALl, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra Introduction at 7.
218 Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088 (Me. 2007).
219 SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2007).
220 Stroud v. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d 142 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
217

221

Id. at 150-152.
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Family formation is a contested legal terrain, and the recent past
suggests that the traditional elements of marriage may well be
disaggregated and reassembled to satisfy the needs of the growing segment who have either rejected, been excluded from, or are
frankly uninterested in the common-law rules of marriage. Our
legal system is busy reformulating state-sanctioned marriage in
response to social pressures "from same-sex couples seeking admission; from heterosexual couples seeking to customize their
marriages; and from states, municipalities, and private groups
'222
crafting alternative versions of marriage-like partnerships.
Whether these groups charge into marriage or stay away, they
are changing the institution, in ways to serve their needs.
In a similar vein, the legal culture of family-state relations in
America has been altered so significantly that it is easy now to
misread the lesson of McGuire v. McGuire.223 "[N]ew norms of
family behavior" 2 24 aptly describe the changed rules in a world in
which families are readily blended and upended, and marital
couple households have consequently slipped into minority status. Lydia McGuire's successors may still not obtain support
from their husbands without separating from them, but many
more family governance issues are now subject to judicial resolution than was true in the 1950s. 225 Moreover, the "percentage of
families subject to supervision by state agencies has grown substantially. '22 6 Paradoxically, this upsurge in public regulation of
the family is occurring at the same time as many aspects of family
227
law have become increasingly privatized.
Prioritizing function over form poses difficult policy choices.
Providing an unwed couple with the legal rights and responsibilities of marriage may safeguard the rights of some of these part222

J.Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32

HOFSTRA

L. REV. 31, 32

(2003).
223
224

UTAH

59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953), discussed text supra at notes 80-84.
Ann Laquer Estin, Family Governance in the Age of Divorce, 1998

L. REV. 211, 238.

See id. at 238 ("With large increases in the number of divorced and
nonmarital families, many more families now find themselves before the courts
disputing financial, child-rearing, and other questions.").
226 Id. at 212.
227 See generally Singer, supra note 147, at 1444 ("in virtually all doctrinal
areas, private norm creation and private decision making have supplanted stateimposed rules and structures for governing family related behavior.").
225
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ners at the cost of undermining the autonomy of others who
intentionally opted out of marriage. As a society and as a legal
culture, we are always redefining our institutions. For the past
half-century, at least, we have been reconfiguring marriage and
its alternatives with a pragmatic hand. As a consequence, the
forms of our marriages and our families have grown less central
to the analysis, while the functional attributes of our domestic
households have increasingly taken center stage. We are, in effect, unbundling the legal elements of marriage.

